The Mechanist's Challenge by Anand, Bhupinder Singh
The Mechanist’s Challenge 
Did we really hope to get away with The Gödelian Argument? 
Bhupinder Singh Anand1 
1. Introduction – The Gödelian Argument 
In a 1996 talk given at Oxford [Lu96], J.R. Lucas articulated his original, 1961, Gödelian 
argument [Lu61] afresh as follows: 
The Mechanist claims to have a model of the mind. We ask him whether it is 
consistent: if he cannot vouch for its consistency, it fails at the first examination; it 
just does not qualify as a plausible representation, since it does not distinguish those 
propositions it should affirm from those that it should deny, but is prepared to affirm 
both undiscriminatingly. We take the Mechanist seriously only if he will warrant that 
his purported model of the mind is consistent. In that case it passes the First Public 
Examination, but comes down at the Second, because knowing that it is consistent, 
we know that its Gödelian formula is true, which it cannot itself produce as true.  
More succinctly, we can, if a Mechanist presents us with a system that he claims is a 
model of the mind, ask him simply whether or not it can prove its Gödelian formula 
(according to some system of Gödel numbering). If he says it can, we know that it is 
inconsistent, and would be equally able to prove that 2 and 2 make 5, or that 0=1, and 
we waste little time on examining it. If, however, he acknowledges that the system 
cannot prove its Gödelian formula, then we know it is consistent, since it cannot 
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prove every well-formed formula, and knowing that it is consistent, know also that its 
Gödelian formula is true.  
In this formulation we have, essentially, a dialogue between the Mechanist and the 
Mentalist, as we may call him, with the Mechanist claiming to be able to produce a 
mechanist model of the Mentalist's mind, and the Mentalist being able to refute each 
particular instance offered. 
2. Do we really hope to get away with this argument? 
Do we really hope to get away with this argument? 
For instance, when we ask a Mechanist whether or not his model can prove its Gödelian 
formula, the Mechanist would be quite justified in asking: 
Before I commit my resources to something that is impossible, can you assure me that 
it is provable? 
Of course we cannot, since we, too, cannot give the proof of the formula that we are 
asking of the Mechanist’s model. 
If we were to, nevertheless, attempt to assert our superiority over the Mechanist by 
claiming, somewhat superciliously, that we do know, however, that the formula in 
question is true, but that the Mechanist’s model does not, we would cut an even sorrier 
figure. The prompt, astonished - and subtly cunning - reply would be: 
Whatever gave you that idea! My model can even prove that it’s true. 
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3. The Mechanist’s Challenge 
If, unwittingly, we were to express incredulity, we would face the humiliating challenge: 
The Gödelian formula ([Go31], p25, Gödel refers to it by its Gödel-number, 17Genr) 
is of the form [(Ax)R(x)]. Neither of us can prove it from the agreed set of premises 
by the specified rules of inference of the Arithmetic in question ([Go31], p25(1), 
“17Genr is not κ-provable”). However, for a large enough numeral [n], my model 
can always provide a proof sequence for [R(1)&R(2)& ... &R(n)] from the premises 
faster than you. 
The reason we would have to sheepishly concede defeat, without even addressing the 
challenge, is that Gödel ([1931], p22(45)) has given a primitive recursive relation, xBy2, 
which ensures that the Mechanist - whose model contains Turing's Universal Machines as 
sub-models - can provide a proof of [R(n)] for any given numeral [n] (cf. [Go31], 
p26(2)). 
Further, since our definition of the truth of a formula under an interpretation is based on 
Tarski’s specification that it hold exhaustively, i.e., every instantiation of it must hold in 
the interpretation ([Me64], p51), our argument for our intellectual superiority over the 
Mechanist’s model fails miserably in this particular instance. 
End of story? 
Not quite.  
                                                 
2
 Gödel ([Go1931], p22, def. 45) defines xBy (primitive) recursively in the standard interpretation of a 
Peano Arithmetic so that it holds for natural numbers x, y, if, and only if, x is the Gödel-number of a proof 
sequence in the Arithmetic for the formula of the Arithmetic whose Gödel-number is y. 
 
 4 
4. There’s more to come … 
We could try to find solace, and console ourselves, with the fact that our brains are not 
designed ideally to tackle problems that can only be tackled by brute force, but are, 
surely, superior to the Mechanist’s model when it comes to proofs that require ingenuity. 
However, we will, then, face even greater discomfiture. 
Gödel has given ([Go31], p22(44)) another primitive recursive predicate, Bw(x)3, that the 
Mechanist can program on a UTM to - given sufficient time - create a set of theorems 
that will contain, and continue to be larger than, the set of all the arithmetical theorems 
that we have ever proven, and verified, collectively, using only pencil, paper, and our 
superior intellects! 
Moreover, the set would contain theorems that we could not even conceptualise, since we 
would be unable to grasp even the statement, leave alone the proof, of these theorems. 
5. Conclusion 
So, what is really wrong with the Gödelian argument?  
Well, ironically - and perhaps paradoxically - it's simply another instance of human 
insecurity applying very common, and very human, double standards - namely, matching 
our truth against the Mechanist's provability - to subtly load the dice in our favour when 
faced with semantic arguments that threaten to expose the continuing inability of the 
human ego to come to terms adequately with, and tap constructively into, the awesome 
conceptual power, diversity, and potential of any Intelligence, human or otherwise. 
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